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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
FRED MEYER and/or LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
COURT OF APPEALS
Defendants/Appellants,
Case No. 890698-CA
vs.
Category 6
LILETH SHELLEY, THE EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND and THE UTAH
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Petitioner/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT LILETH SHELLEY

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to the provisions
of Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Ann. (1988).

This matter is an

appeal from a final order of the Industrial Commission wherein
compensation was awarded to the Respondent.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The Respondent submits that there are no specific determinative
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules in
connection with this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not have any major disagreements with the
facts as cited by the Appellant in its brief.
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However, it may be

helpful to stress what Respondent deems to be important in the
Court's consideration of the facts:
1.

Respondent Lileth Shelley was 50 years old at the time of

the 1985 industrial injury in question.

At that time she had

been employed by the Appellant for over 13 years as a warehouse
worker. (R. at 2, 33, 34.)
2.

The 1985 injury occurred while Mrs. Shelly was twisting on

a ladder and lifting a 3 5 lb. box of shower curtains over the
protective railing of the ladder. (R. at 35, 36.)
3.

Mrs. Shelley had sustained two prior low back injuries,

both occurred while on the job and while employed by the
Appellant.

The first was in 1975

and occurred while she was

lifting a 35 to 40 lb. cases of shoes. (R. at 62)

The second

low back injury occurred in 1978 when Mrs. Shelley was bending
over a waist high case containing boxes of tightly packed
underwear.

As she was struggling to remove the boxes from the

case, she felt her back pop. (R. at 54.)
4.

The Respondent received medical treatment from Dr. Harold

P. Hargreaves for each of the two prior injuries.

She was also

treated by Dr. Allred after the 1978 injury and wore a corset for
about five months following this injury.

She testified that

after these injuries, she occasional problems with her back. (R.
at 55, 306.)
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5.

Mrs. Shelley's medical history shows no other prior

injuries to her back, that she had not experienced any problems
with her back prior to the 1975 industrial accident.

The medical

records further give no indication of any disease or back problem
of any kind prior to the 1975 injury. (R. at 52, 52, 69, 71, 161,
162. )
6.

Mrs. Shelley's treating physicians after the 1985 injury,

Dr. S. William Allred, and Dr. J. Charles Rich, diagnosed Mrs.
Shelley as having a pre-existing condition in 1985 of
degenerative spondylolisthesis, a condition which is often
started by trauma to the back.

This was attributed to the prior

work injuries. (R. at 102, 217, 270, 272.)
7.

Mrs. Shelley was rated by both Dr. Allred as having a 25%

whole body impairment with 12 1/2% due to the 1985 injury and 12
1/2% due to the pre-existing problem. (R. at 102.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mrs. Shelley

sustained an injury on the job in May of 1985.

Prior to that date, she had had two other back injuries, both of
which were job related.

She had not had had any back trouble

prior to the first industrial injury in 1975.
The record shows that the Industrial Commission had substantial
evidence upon which to base the finding that Mrs. Shelley's pre5

existing condition as of 1985 was due to prior industrial
injuries incurred while employed by the same employer.
The Allen decision does not conflict with the determination by
the Commission that, for purposes of the initial issue of whether
a compensable accident has occurred, a pre-existing condition due
to prior work injuries incurred while in the employ of the same
employer does not require use of the higher legal standard of
legal causation set forth in Allen.

This is true, in part,

because in such a situation, the employee does bring a personal
risk to the workplace.

Rather, with the workplace as the cause

of all related impairment, there is no basis on which to excuse
the employer from liability for the final injury.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT'S
PRE-EXISTING BACK CONDITION IS DUE TO WORK INJURIES IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

It is not disputed that Mrs. Shelley had a pre-existing
condition at the time of her 1985 industrial accident.

It is

also not disputed that, under the facts as found by the
Industrial Commission, Mrs. Shelley's activities at the time of
the accident did not meet the extra exertion requirements of
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
However, the Commission also found that Mrs. Shelley's preexisting condition was the result of prior industrial accidents
incurred while employed by the same employer.
In this appeal, the main issue before this Court is whether an
injured worker must show unusual or extraordinary exertion in
order to establish legal causation when the pre-existing
condition is due to prior industrial accidents that occurred
while working for the same employer.
The Commissioners of the Industrial Commission found that the
higher legal causation standard as set forth in the Allen
decision need not be met when the pre-existing condition is due
to problems brought on by prior industrial accidents suffered
7

while the employee was working for the same employer.

The

reasoning set forth by the Commission in its final order is sound
and should be ratified by this Court.
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION
First, the Commission considered the evidence concerning the
origin of the pre-existing condition in order to determine
whether it was due to on-the-job injuries or non-industrial
causes.
On appeal, this Court must consider whether there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the

Commission's

determination that Mrs. Shelley's pre-existing condition arose
due to prior job related injuries. U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-85,
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306
(Utah 1985).

This is the proper standard of review inasmuch as

this case was commenced in May of 1987, before the effective date
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 63-46b-l to -22, UCA
(1988 Supp).
There is no evidence in the record to show that Mrs. Shelley
suffers from any congenital back problem nor that she had any
problems that pre-dated her first back injury in 1975.
At the evidentiary hearing, she testified that the first
injury to her back occurred at work in 1975 (R. at 52). Mrs•
Shelley also testified that she had not had a problem with her
back prior to the 1975 injury (R. at 69). Her testimony does not
8

reveal any back problems other than those ensuing after her three
industrial injuries.
The medical records from the Respondent's treating physicians
further support this.

For example, in the records of Dr. Harold

Hargreaves, M.D., an x-ray summary for a film taken in 1975
states "Lumbar spine normal." (R. at 162). His records do not
show anything relating to the back prior to 1975, although the
Respondent had seen him first in February of 1969 (R. at 161).
The records of Dr. Kenneth Guymon mention a work injury to the
back in May of 1978 and a previous back injury three years before
(the 1975 injury) (R. at 171). Although he treated various ills
beginning in 1972, there is nothing in Dr. Guymon's records to
suggest of prior back problems.
In a letter dated June 13, 1985, Dr. J. Charles Rich, M.D.,
Mrs. Shelley's neurologist, stated, "...the only episodes of back
pain she has ever had (have) been those related not only with
work but with this same employer over the course of the last few
years. " (R. at 217).
Dr. Rich, in an operative report dated 7/23/85, stated, as to
preoperative and post operative diagnoses, "L5-S1 disk herniation
and degenerative spondylolisthesis." (R. at 270).
Degenerative spondylolisthesis is the slipping of one
vertebra over another due to degenerative processes (ie. the
result of trauma) rather than due to congenital defects.
9

Dr. William Allred, M.D., the treating orthopedic surgeon,
stated in the 7/31/85 discharge summary of a finding of "L5-S1
central disc defect with a bilateral nerve root compression L4-5
and mild degenerative Pseudo-spondylolisthesis." (R. at 272).
Further, Dr. Allred's 1987

Summary of Medical Record indicates a

50/50 apportionment between pre-existing conditions and the 1985
industrial injury.

In responding to a question of aggravation he

stated as follows:
10. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's preexisting condition? Please explain as necessary.
Yes. The patient had had two previous episodes of back pain
of brief duration.
(R. at 102).
In connection with the claim and after the evidentiary
hearing, the Appellant hired Dr. David Beck to examine Mrs.
Shelley.

Dr. Beck, who saw the Respondent only once,

stated the

opinion that the 1975 and 1978 injuries probably have no bearing
on Mrs. Shelley's long-term problem.

He apparently attributed

the pre-existing portion of the back problem to other origins.
However, this is just Dr. Beck's opinion and it is not supported
by any explanation or evidence (R. at 293, 294).
The Commission, as stated in its final order, found no
evidence in the record to show that any of Mrs. Shelley's back
problems were due to congenital defects or anything pre-dating
the first industrial injury of 1975.
10

Rather, it found ample

reasons for the factual conclusion that the pre-existing problems
in Mrs. Shelley's back are due to the prior work injuries (R. at
334) .
Thus, it is seen that the Commission's conclusion that the
pre-existing condition of the lower back

was due to the prior

industrial accidents incurred while working for the same employer
is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.

POINT II
THE ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE HOLDING IN ALLEN
The Appellant urges that the principles adopted by the Court
in Allen v. Industrial Commission, supra, do not support the
conclusions reached by the Commission in this matter.

However,

Appellant's analysis is flawed and is incorrect.
In Allen the Utah Supreme Court adopted a test which requires,
in the context of legal causation, that a claimant with a preexisting condition show that the injury
exertion.

resulted from extra

A worker without a pre-existing condition does not

have to meet the higher standard.

The reason stated for the

extra exertion requirement was to determine whether "the employee
brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a pre11

existing condition." Allen at 25.

The Court stated that the

adoption of a higher standard of legal causation in such a case
would serve to "offset the pre-existing condition of the employee
as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for
impairment resulting from a personal risk rather than exertion at
work." Allen at 25. (Emphasis added).
Where the medical evidence shows that an injured worker's
problems are directly related to the work injury in question,
legal causation should not be defeated on the pretext of a preexisting injury where it is established that such pre-existing
injury was created in the same workplace in which the accident in
question occurred.

The worker in such a situation does not bring

any personal element of risk to the workplace.
Hence, where a worker brings no pre-existing injury to the
workplace, but has a compensable injury (or injuries) on the job,
and subsequently while on the job sustains an otherwise
compensable injury to the same area of the body, he should not
have to meet the higher legal standard to establish
compensability, if the injury was incurred while working for the
same employer.

This is because the worker's increased risk of

injury with respect to the later claim is attributable strictly
to the hazards previously encountered at that same employment.
In such a situation, the purposes for invoking the higher
legal causation standard do not apply.
12

There is no reason to

shelter the employer from liability for the last injury.

The

language and reasoning of Allen do not mandate a different
conclusion, but in fact support it.

13

POINT III
THE TORGERSON AND OTVOS CASES ARE NOT APPLICABLE
TO THIS CASE
The Appellant has argued that the holding in Richfield Care
Center v. Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178 (Utah 1987) would be summarily
reversed by affirming the Industrial Commission's order in this
case.

A reading of Torgerson shows this claim to be incorrect

and without merit.
In fact, in Torgerson the Court upheld the Commission's
finding that the claimant therein had met the higher legal
causation test.

Hence, the Court did not reach, nor need to

reach, the question of how the pre-existing condition there would
impact on causation if the unusual exertion standard had not been
met.
The question of apportionment in Torgerson, wherein there were
three back injuries, two of which were industrial, is
inapplicable in this case.

Further, unlike in Torgerson, herein

no claim was made concurrent with the last accident for permanent
physical impairment compensation for the prior industrial
accidents.

(In fact, the eight year statute of limitations had

expired on the 1975 and 1978 accidents by the time the claim in
question was filed).
Conversely, apportionment in this case is not an issue.

14

Appellant also cites Otvos v. Industrial Commission, 751 P.2d
263 (Utah App. 1988) in support of its contention that the
Industrial Commission's order should not be upheld.
A readincj of Otvos, however, shows that it does not even deal
with the question of legal causation.

Rather, the issues therein

dealt with whether certain impairments could be combined to meet
minimum threshold requirements for payment of permanent partial
disability compensation under the Combined Injury Statute, 35-169, Utah Code Ann.

It does not have any application in this

case.
POINT IV
AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY/ RESPONSIBILITY BEST RESTS WITH
THE EMPLOYER WITH WHOM THE DISABILITY BEGAN
Were the Court to not uphold the Commission's determination in
this matter, the results would distinctly damage the interests
of injured workers.

In such a case, workers whose bodies are

injured by prior industrial accidents could be foreclosed from
receiving compensation from their employers for subsequent
injuries that are the final blow to an already weakened back, or
knee, or other part of the body, but that don't meet the higher
legal causation standard due to the work-related pre-existing
condition.
It would be analogous to the vase, previously cracked by an
accident, which continues to hold water until a final incident
15

shatters it.

Perhaps, without the pre-existing cracks, the vase

would not have shattered.

However, if all the damage was done by

the same party, such individual or employer should not be excused
from liability for the final blow just because the last act did
not involve usual exertion or activity.
The Appellant argues that as a matter of public policy, this
Court should not uphold the Industrial Commission's analysis.
However, there are sound reasons why, as a matter of policy,
protection should be extended to the worker with pre-existing
current-job related injuries.
answered with a question:

The matter is perhaps best

Who but the employer is in the best

position to assume the costs of an injury that is an aggravation
of a pre-existing work related disease?
The issue before this Court does not involve the question of
apportionment for the pre-existing versus current injury
impairment.

Such is adequately handled by existing statutes and

court holdings.

The issue here is only one of standards for

legal causation.

CONCLUSION
The record fully supports the action taken by the Industrial
Commission.

The Commission did not act arbitrarily or abuse its

discretion in finding Mrs. Shelley's pre-existing condition to be

16

job related.

Accordingly,its determination should not be set

aside on appeal.
The Commission was justified under the philosophy of the Allen
decision to find that the higher legal standard of causation need
not be satisfied when the worker brings no personal risk to the
workplace, but suffers from a pre-existing job-related injury at
the time of the final injury.

This policy should be ratified by

the Court.
This Court should affirm the action of the Industrial
Commission and uphold the award of compensation to Mrs. Shelley.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd day~X)f April, 1990.

Phillip B. Shelj.
)
\
Day & Barney
Attorneys for Respondent Shelley
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ADDENDUM
1.

Order Granting Motion for Review
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 87000483

LILETH SHELLEY,
Applicant,
VS.
FRED MEYER, LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, and THE
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*

ORDER GRANTING

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*
*
*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah on Motion of the applicant, Lileth
Shelley, reviews the Order of the Administrative Law Judge in the above
entitled matter dated July 13, 1989, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
An Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission in an Order
dated July 13, 1989, denied the applicants claim for compensation under the
Utah Workers Compensation Act, holding that the claimant, Lileth Shelley,
failed to carry her burden of proof in establishing that she had received an
industrial injury.
The Administrative Law Judge based his decision on the
fact that the applicant was unable to show any unusual or extraordinary
exertion to establish legal causation as required under Allen vs Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1989), because of the applicant's pre-existing
lower back condition.
The applicant filed a Motion for Review which was
received by the Industrial Commission on August 11, 1989, arguing that the
applicant in this case should net be required to meet the higher standard of
unusual or extraordinary exertion in order to establish legal causation
because her pre-existing conditions were the result of previous industrial
injuries received while employed by the same employer.
The applicant, Lileth Shelley, worked for Defendant, Fred Meyer or
its predecessor, Grand Central Stores, for thirteen (13) years.
She was
injured
in industrial accidents while working for this employer in 1975, and
1978, injuring her lower back each time.
Although the claimant did not
require continuing medical treatment as the result of these injuries, she
testified at the hearing that her problems following the 1975 accident never
entirely resolved.
The 1975 and 1978 injuries were accepted as industrial
injuries
and benefits,
including
medical
expenses, were paid by the
applicant's employer.

LILETH SHELLEY
ORDER
PAGE TWO

In this case, the applicant suffered an injury on the job on May 3,
1985. She was working in the warehouse for the employer, Fred Meyer, and had
climbed a ladder and lifted a box of shower curtains weighing approximately
thirty five pounds over a twelve or eighteen inch barrier and then climbed
down the ladder with them. Shortly after reaching the bottom of the ladder
she felt an onset of pain in her lower back.
The applicant sought medical
attention
and unsuccessfully tried to resolve her back problems with
conservative treatment.
Further examination revealed that she had a disc herniation
centrally at the L5-S1 level and a soft tissue bulge at the L4-L5 level. The
claimant eventually received surgery for relief of these problems including a
failed attempt to fuse her back at two levels. She then received a second
surgery to fuse her back at two levels which was successful. Thereafter, her
treating physician, Dr. Allred rated her at a twenty-five percent (257«)
impairment of the whole person with 12.5% due to the 1985 accident and 12.5%
due to the 1975 and 1978 injuries. The claimant's testimony and the records
of Dr. Rich state that the only episodes of back pain the applicant has ever
had were those related to her work with the same employer. Following the
hearing in this matter the defendants obtained leave of the Commission to
conduct an independent medical exam by Dr. David Beck. Dr. Beck concurred in
the
twenty-five
percent
(25%) impairment
rating
of Dr. Allred, also
attributing one-half to the 1985 industrial accident and the other half to
"pre-existing conditions including disease." In Dr. Beck's report he states,
"I feel that the injuries of 1975 and 1978 probably have no bearing on her
long term problem." However, Dr. Beck does not provide any explanation for
the claimant's herniated disc other than her previous industrial injuries, and
there is no evidence in the record to show that any of her back problems
pre-date her industrial injuries.
In reviewing the medical records the
Commission finds no indication of any congenital back problems that pre-date
her industrial injuries or other injuries to the claimant's back other than
the industrial injuries received while working for the same employer.
The
medical records indicate that the calcification of the applicant's herniation
show that the herniation was not of recent origin and, therefore, was not
caused by the 1985 accident but rather by an earlier injury to the applicant's
back.
The testimony of the applicant and the records are clear that the
applicant has at no time received an injury to her back except from the
previous industrial accidents while working for the same employer.
The
Commission, therefore, finds that the pre-existing condition of the lower back
from which the applicant was suffering was due to the 1975 and 1978 industrial
accidents while working for the same employer.
The Commission finds that the issue for determination in this case is
whether the applicant's pre-existing condition, which were the result of
previous
accidents while employed by the same employer, requires the
application of the higher standard for determining legal causation as
annunciated by the Supreme Court in Allen. In other words, must the applicant
show unusual or extraordinary exertion in order to establish legal causation
where the pre-existing conditions from which she was suffering were the result
of industrial accidents that occurred while working for the same employer?

LILETH SHELLEY
ORDER
PAGE THREE

In determining whether an employee has suffered a compensable injury
a determination must be made as to whether that injury was by "accident
arising out of and in the course of employment."
The Supreme Court in the
Allen case requires us first to determine whether there was an accident. The
Court in that case defines accident as "an unexpected or unintended occurrence
that may be the cause or the result of an injury."
In this case the
applicant, Lileth Shelley, did suffer an accident, as the injury to her back
was certainly an unexpected result of her activity. The Court then requires
us to determine whether a causal connection exists between the injury and the
worker's employment duties.
To determine causation requires a two-part
analysis.
One part is a medical question.
That is, was the strain or
exertion of the employment duties medically related to the injury suffered by
the applicant? The medical records in this case seem clear that the problems
experienced by the applicant were directly related to her current employment
duties.
The other part of the analysis requires a determination of legal
causation. That is, was the exertion sufficient to be determined the legal
cause of the injury to the applicant? The Allen Court stated that in a case
where there is no pre-existing condition "usual exertion" would be sufficient
to satisfy the legal causation test. However, the Court stated that in cases
that involve pre-existing conditions a higher test, one requiring the showing
of unusual or extraordinary exertion, must be met in order to show legal
causation.
The question in this case is whether the applicant, who has a
pre-existing condition which is the result of previous industrial injuries
received while working with the same employer, require the application of this
higher standard?
In the Allen case the Court justified the higher standard
for persons with a pre-existing conditions by stating its purpose was to
determine whether the employee brings to the work place a personal element of
risk such as a pre-existing condition and that the higher standard would serve
"to offset the pre-existing condition of the employee as the likely cause of
the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairment resulting from a
personal risk rather than exertions at work." (emphasis added).
Allen vs
Industrial Commission, id. at 25.
In applying the requirements of Allen to the instant case, the
Commission finds that the purpose for requiring the higher standard of those
with pre-existing conditions does not apply in cases where the pre-existing
conditions are the result of industrial accidents previously suffered while in
the employment of the same employer. An individual who undertakes employment
bringing with him no "personal risk" from pre-existing conditions who then
suffers an industrial accident involving "ordinary exertion" would be found to
have received a compensable injury. If later that same employee, now impaired
because of the first industrial accident, suffers a second industrial accident
involving the same area of the body, he still brings to his employment no
"personal risk" but rather an increased risk of injury that is attributable
strictly to the hazards encountered at that employment.
In this type of
situation the stated purposes for application of the higher legal standard do
not exist. The Commission, therefore, finds that the higher legal causation
standard should not be applied in cases where the pre-existing condition is a
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result of previous industrial accidents suffered while the applicant was
employed with the same employer responsible for the most recent accident.
Here, the applicants pre-existing condition resulted from a risk associated
with her employment with Fred Meyer and/or its predecessor, Grand Central
Stores, thus there is no reason to shelter the employer from liability for
that injury.
The Commission finds that the applicant, Lileth Shelley, did sustain
a compensable injury by accident during the course of her employment on May 3,
1985, while employed by the defendant employer, Fred Meyer. The period of
temporary total disability resulting from the May 3, 1985, injury was from May
4, 1985, to and including April 30, 1987.
Also, the Commission finds that the applicant is suffering from a
permanent physical impairment of 25% of the whole man. Of this 25%, 12,5% is
attributable to the industrial injury of May 3, 1985, and the remaining 12.5%
is due to the pre-existing conditions caused by the two prior industrial
injuries, in 1975 and 1978, while working for the same employer.
In addition, the Commission finds that the low back injuries of 1975
and 1978 are the cause of the pre-existing conditions of record.
All other Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge, not found
contrary to the Commission's findings above, are adopted by the Commission as
its own.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the order of the Administrative Law
Judge is hereby reversed and the Motion for Review of the Applicant is hereby
granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Fred Meyer, and/or Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company pay the Applicant, Lileth Shelley, temporary total
compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from May 4, 1985 to April 30,
1987, inclusive, for a period of 103.857 weeks for a total of $24,925.68, less
attorney's fees as awarded herein below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
Mutual Insurance Company pay to
permanent partial impairment of
week for 39 weeks, commencing May

that Defendant, Fred Meyer, and/or Liberty
the Applicant the sum of $8,073.00 for 12.5%
the whole person at the rate of $207.00 per
1, 1987.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Employers Reinsurance Fund pay to the
Applicant the sum of $8,073.00 for 12.5% permanent partial impairment of the
whole person for pre-existing conditions at the rate of $207.00 per week for
39 weeks, commencing January 29, 1988.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Fred Meyer and/or Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company pay interest on the amount awarded herein, at the
rate of 8% per annum from the date each benefit payment would otherwise become
due and payable pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants, Fred Meyer and/or Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company pay to Phillip B. Shell, attorney for the applicant,
the sum of $6,357.17 for services rendered in this matter, the same to be
deducted from the award of temporary total compensation to the applicant and
remitted directly to Phillip B. Shell.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Fred Meyer and/or Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of
the industrial accident of May 3, 1985, said expenses to be paid in accordance
with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Industrial Commission of
Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund of Utah
reimburse Fred Meyer and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company fifty percent
(50%) of all temporary total disability and medical expenses incurred by
Defendants, Fred Meyer and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as a result of
the industrial accident of May 3, 1985.
Any appeal shall be to the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30)
days of the date hereof pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sections 35-1-82.53(2),
35-1-86 and Utah Code Ann., Section 63-461^16,
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